Upjohn Institute Policy and Research Briefs

Upjohn Research home page

10-1-2019

Is a Driverless Future Also Jobless?
Erica L. Groshen
Cornell University ILR School and W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

John Paul MacDuffie
University of Pennsylvania

Susan Helper
Case Western Reserve University

Charles Carson
Independent researcher

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_policybriefs
Part of the Labor Economics Commons

Citation
Groshen, Erica L., John Paul MacDuffie, Susan Helper, and Charles Carson. 2019. "Is a Driverless Future
Also Jobless?" Policy Brief. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
https://doi.org/10.17848/pb2019-17

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

SEPTEMBER 2019

POLICY BRIEF
Is a Driverless Future Also Jobless?
Erica L. Groshen, John Paul MacDufe, Susan Helper, and Charles Carson
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n The advent of autonomous vehicles
(AVs) would change the nature of
work throughout the economy, with
potential harm for some workers,
their communities, and families.
n Effects on workers would likely
mount slowly and peak between the
late 2040s and early 2050s, raising the
U.S. unemployment rate by 0.06−0.13
percentage points and causing average
wealth losses of $80,000–$120,000 per
displaced worker.
n Workforce costs could be reduced
by addressing gaps that slow
transitions: skills, geography, worker
voice, and investment.
n To avoid costly layoffs, employers
can actively retain and retrain
workers, and policymakers can
strengthen the workforce development
system by improving data, coverage,
flexibility, reliance on evidence,
efficiency, and employer engagement
with worker representatives.
n Policymakers and employers have
time to invest to avoid AVs’ otherwise
consequential costs to workers and
their communities. In so doing, they
will also lessen resistance to future
U.S. innovation.

For additional details, see see https://
research.upjohn.org/up_technicalreports/36/.

O
ver a dozen companies are developing autonomous vehicles (AVs) for commercial,
transit, and personal use. We’ve seen some in action in videos or on city streets. When

we see them, our frst concern may be safety, but next is ofen fear of lost jobs. AVs
have the potential to lower the costs of goods and services, generate new jobs, and even
build new industries. However, a transition to AVs will create challenges: changes in the
nature of work in transportation and beyond will likely harm some workers and their
communities.
Te U.S. labor market is resilient, and workers have proven their ability to learn new
skills over time. AVs will catalyze many new jobs, the nature, location, and timing of
which we can’t precisely anticipate. Te fip side is that some tasks, particularly driving,
will become less necessary.
To grapple with these issues, we have designed a framework to clarify the nature of
AVs’ workforce impacts. We have reviewed past innovations for lessons, gauged the size
and timing of the coming disruptions, and advanced policy recommendations.
We fnd that the workforce impacts of adopting AVs will be consequential but far
from catastrophic. All told, 1.3−2.3 million workers may be displaced due to adoption
of AVs. Layofs will likely mount gradually, with a peak between the late 2040s and early
2050s under current deployment forecasts. At peak, this will add between 0.06 and 0.13
percentage points to the U.S. unemployment rate.
Now isn’t the time to panic, but policymakers and business leaders cannot aford
complacency either. Tis impact is similar in size to the recent “China shock” to U.S.
manufacturing jobs.
Smart choices can help close four gaps that impose costs on workers and interfere
with employers fnding the workers they need: 1) skills, 2) geography, 3) worker voice,
and 4) investment. Specifcally, employers can actively retain and retrain workers to
avoid costly layofs. Policymakers can strengthen our workforce development system
by improving data, coverage, fexibility, reliance on evidence, and engagement with
employers. Both should use available time to invest in the workforce to avoid AVs’
otherwise consequential costs and, in so doing, promote U.S. innovation going forward.

Lessons from History and Framework for AVs’ Workforce Impact
Labor market impacts of previous disruptive changes can provide lessons for the
current situation. Importantly, in our dynamic economy, losing one set of jobs does not
lower employment permanently. New jobs are ofen created when others are lost. For
example, although farm jobs have dropped from 50 percent of the total at the turn of the
20th century to just 2 percent today, the majority of Americans are still employed, and we
produce more food than in the past. Technological change can thus lead to large social
benefts in the long run.
Yet, benefts can be long delayed and the change can impose signifcant costs on
displaced workers and their communities. Hence, there are two reasons for concern
about the impending adoption of AVs. First, losses tend to accumulate before widespread
gains, substantially afecting particular people and geographic and demographic
communities more than others, with uncertainty about impacts in advance. Tese
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Te central risk from
large disruptions stems
not from a permanent
decline in jobs but
from costs imposed on
displaced workers.

consequential losses are largely uncompensated and can fuel unrest and resistance to
innovation. Second, the size and distribution of benefts are also difcult to predict. In
particular, wage stagnation, even in the face of signifcant productivity gains over recent
decades, casts doubt on whether the benefts of a technology like AVs would indeed
be shared, and causes worry among those who already believe they are just getting by.
During the Industrial Revolution, U.S. real wages fell for 50 years—reversed only by
policy steps, including collective bargaining laws, child-labor laws, public high school,
and extended voting rights.
In addition, we cannot rule out the possibility that the advent of AVs and, more
generally, artifcial intelligence technology will result in a diferent mix of efects than
in the past. In particular, artifcial intelligence may lead to greater automation of highskilled work and thus adversely afect higher-paying jobs and skills.
Figure 1 establishes a framework to help trace the labor market impacts of AVs,
drawing on both historical experience and economic theory. It clarifes that the central
risk from large disruptions stems not from a permanent decline in jobs but from costs
imposed on displaced workers and potentially slow adjustments to the disruption.
Eventually, new jobs will return the economy to full employment afer the job losses from
AV adoption. Tree forces create new jobs:
1) People will use more transportation when it becomes less expensive and safer.
2) Suppliers of AV-related goods and services will expand to meet demand.
3) Consumers will increase purchases of other goods and services with money saved
when transportation becomes safer and cheaper.
However, an eventual return to full employment misses the heart of the matter.
How large are losses to workers, how long will adjustments take, and what can we do to
mitigate the costs? Te framework points to four gaps that make workers’ adjustments
slower and costlier:
1) Displaced workers may not have the skills needed for new jobs.
2) Tey may not live in the same areas where new jobs arise.
Figure 1 Impact of Adoption of Autonomous Vehicles on the Labor Market
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SOURCE: Authors, inspired by Joss Fong, “Why the rise of the robots won’t mean the end of work,” Vox, November
13, 2017.

2

POLICY BRIEF | SEPTEMBER 2019

Technology alone does
not determine outcomes
such as the quality of
new jobs.

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

3) Lack of worker voice, bargaining power, and supportive institutions could mean
that workers’ losses are exacerbated.
4) Firms may lack the ability or will to invest because of poor economic conditions
or other impediments.
Te historical cases we reviewed demonstrate that technology alone does not
determine outcomes such as the quality of new jobs. We have not managed past
transitions well. Te average displaced American worker loses signifcant lifetime wealth
(1.5−2.0 years of predisplacement earnings) from lost work time and lower hours and
wages afer reemployment.

Simulation of Impacts
We use our framework to simulate key impacts of AV adoption over the next few
decades. We consider four adoption scenarios developed by Securing America’s Future
Energy:
1) Cars-Personal: Passenger vehicles owned by households, as is now the case
2) Cars-Fleet: Passenger vehicles owned by feets, where a set of transportation
service providers own and operate most cars and light trucks
3) Trucking-Slow: Commercial trucking with slow adoption, taking about 30 years
to move from driver-assisted autonomous vehicles to trucks that do not need
drivers at all
4) Trucking-Fast: Commercial trucking with aggressive adoption, proceeding to full
autonomy much more quickly
We base our simulations on the experiences of recently displaced workers, data on
the occupations likely afected, and estimated earnings losses from displacement. We
follow previous studies in identifying at-risk occupations, building on occupational
classifcations identifed as “driving related” by the U.S. Commerce Department. In
consultation with industry experts, we set the percentage of workers in each occupation
who are at risk of layof under each AV scenario. Tese include truck and bus drivers,
taxi and other personal transport employees, and other drivers. We consider other
job losses from the adoption of AVs, such as automobile insurance adjusters, auto
repair mechanics, and police patrol ofcers. We adjust these job losses for projected
occupational turnover (workers leaving occupations for reasons other than the rise of
AVs) to produce estimates of displacement.
From recent U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Displaced Worker Surveys we construct
the likely path followed by a cohort of displaced workers, who can shif between three
possible labor force states (employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force) in the years
afer displacement.
With this information, for each of the four scenarios, we simulate how AV adoption
will afect the number of unemployed workers and labor force exits over the coming
decades. We fnd that the introduction of AVs could directly eliminate between 1.3 and
2.3 million workers’ jobs over the next 30 years, depending on the adoption scenario
followed. Figure 2 shows the consequences for the unemployment rate by year for
combinations of the four scenarios. Efects on workers will likely grow gradually, with
peak unemployment impacts expected between the late 2040s and early 2050s under
current deployment forecasts. AV-related displacement is expected to add 0.06−0.013
percentage points, at peak, to the U.S. unemployment rate.
Displaced workers stand to lose an average of about $80,000–$120,000 each in lifetime
earnings from lost work hours and lower subsequent wages. Aggregated across the next
several decades as AVs deploy, this would translate into wealth losses of $100−$200
billion for the AV-afected workforce and their families and communities—or up to $300
billion if the job losses happen during a recession.
3
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Percentage-point difference in unemployment rate

We have not managed
past transitions well.

Figure 2 Autonomous Vehicles’ Impact on Additional Unemployment, by Year and
Adoption Scenario
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

We also fnd that another 7.7 million workers are likely to see their duties change
because they are in occupations with secondary, driving-related duties (such as home
health aides, building contractors, visiting nurses, and real estate agents). AVs should
increase productivity in these occupations, but the impact on wages and number of jobs
is very uncertain.
While it is tempting to view these fgures as small relative to the workforce as a whole,
the displacements are concentrated among professional drivers and in certain geographic
areas. Te magnitude of the impact and its concentration is similar to the recent “China
shock” to U.S. manufacturing jobs in the past two decades.

Policy Recommendations
Ignoring likely labor disruptions from AVs could fuel a backlash against acceptance
of AVs and future innovations. Tus, to help at-risk communities, policymakers may be
tempted to stall the deployment of AVs to provide greater time for workforce adaptation.
Such eforts may prove counterproductive. Not only will a lag in deployment delay the
societal benefts of AVs, but the United States risks ceding global leadership in this
industry.
Unlocking AVs’ benefts and mitigating long-lasting impacts to the U.S. workforce
require moving forward on AV technology while simultaneously addressing our
workforce development infrastructure and encouraging retention and retraining. Many
policy options are available. With robust workforce statistics, communication among
stakeholders, program evaluations, and an enhanced workforce development system, the
task is manageable but requires attention as soon as possible. Te economic benefts of
AVs, which some have estimated at nearly $1 trillion per year, should provide adequate
resources for such policy intervention.
Te authors gratefully acknowledge funding from Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE), a nonproft group
focused on reducing U.S. oil dependence. Although we focus on labor market impacts of AVs, SAFE reports have
shown that other benefts and costs could also be large.
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